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Abstract: 
Recent research on motivational intensity has shown that explicit manipulations of self-focused 
attention (e.g., mirrors and video cameras) increase effort-related cardiovascular responses 
during active coping. An experiment examined whether masked first name priming, an implicit 
manipulation of self-focused attention, had similar effects. Participants (n = 52 young adults) 
performed a self-paced cognitive task, in which they were told to get as many trials correct as 
possible within 5 min. During the task, the participant's first name was primed for 0%, 33%, 
67%, or 100% of the trials. First name priming, regardless of its frequency, significantly 
increased cardiovascular reactivity, particularly systolic blood pressure (SBP) reactivity. 
Furthermore, the priming manipulation interacted with individual differences in trait self-focus: 
trait self-focus predicted higher SBP reactivity in the 0% condition, but first name priming 
eliminated the effects of individual differences. Implications for self-awareness research and for 
the emerging interest in priming effects on effort are considered. 
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1. Introduction 
When people focus attention on the self, they evaluate the self against standards, norms, and 
goals. Self-focus enables people to monitor their performance and to evaluate whether they have 
fallen short of a goal, so it is a central mechanism in self-regulation and goal striving (Carver, 
2003 and Duval and Silvia, 2001). Most of the research on how self-focus affects motivational 
processes has measured motivation using self-reports, behavioral measures of persistence (how 
long people spend working on a task), or how well people perform (for reviews, see Carver and 
Scheier, 1998 and Silvia and Duval, 2001a).Recent work, however, has examined how self-focus 
affects physiological outcomes, particularly cardiovascular reactivity, during the goal striving 
process (Gendolla et al., 2008, Silvia and al., 2011 and Silvia et al., 2010). 
 
Research on self-focus and effort-related cardiovascular reactivity has used Brehm's motivational 
intensity theory as a framework (Brehm and Self, 1989 and Brehm et al., 1983). Wright (1996) 
integrated this theory with Obrist's (1981) active coping approach to develop a model of the 
cardiovascular dynamics of effort regulation. According to motivational intensity theory, the 
intensity of motivation is a function of the importance of success and the difficulty of behaviors 
needed to achieve the goal. For fixed-difficulty tasks, cardiovascular reactivity is a function of 
task difficulty, provided that success is possible and the goal is worth the effort. Reactivity is low 
when tasks are easy, increases as tasks become more challenging, and then declines when 
achieving the goal is impossible or requires more effort than is justified by the goal's importance 
(for reviews, see Gendolla and Richter, 2010 and Wright and Kirby, 2001). For unfixed-
difficulty tasks — also known as self-paced, piece-rate, and “do your best” tasks — people can 
work at their own pace and thus set their own level of challenge, so cardiovascular reactivity is a 
function of potential motivation (Wright et al., 2002). 
 
Self-focused attention, by inducing self-evaluation, makes achieving a goal more significant and 
self-relevant (Gendolla and Richter, 2010). As a result, self-focus should increase potential 
motivation, the amount of effort that is justified. Research thus far has supported the application 
of motivational intensity theory to self-focused attention. For unfixed-difficulty(self-paced) 
tasks, self-focused people showed higher cardiovascular reactivity, particularly systolic blood 
pressure (SBP) reactivity (Gendolla et al., 2008). For fixed-difficulty tasks, self-focused people 
didn't show greater SBP reactivity for easy or for impossible tasks, for which effort wasn't 
required or justified, but they did show greater SBP reactivity for tasks of intermediate difficulty 
(Gendolla et al., 2008, Study 2; Silvia et al., 2010). Furthermore, these interactive effects of self-
focus and task difficulty on SBP reactivity have been replicated in research that assessed stable 
individual differences in trait self-focus instead of manipulating self-focus (Silvia et al., 2011). 
 
To date, however, studies of self-focus and cardiovascular reactivity have used only explicit 
manipulations of self-focus. These manipulations pose people with obvious, salient reminders of 
the self, and they evoke strong feelings of self-consciousness. Common explicit manipulations 
involve having participants sit in front of a mirror during the experiment (Phillips and Silvia, 
2005), videotaping the participants and showing their image on a monitor (Duval, 1976, Silvia 
and Duval, 2001b and Silvia and Phillips, 2004), or making participants feel distinctive (Silvia 
and Eichstaedt, 2004 and Snow et al., 2004). 
 
A smaller tradition of self-awareness research, however, has explored implicit manipulations of 
self-focused attention. These manipulations direct attention to self and activate self-knowledge 
unobtrusively. The most common implicit manipulation is masked name priming. In one study, 
people were presented their last names (surnames) for 30 ms, followed by a 30 ms mask (Macrae 
et al., 1998). Last name priming significantly affected the self-regulation of social stereotypes. In 
recent work, masked first name priming (presenting the name for 27 ms and a mask for 100 ms) 
made people more likely to behave according to salient situational standards (Silvia and Phillips, 
under review). Another experiment showed that priming self-relevant pronouns (presenting “I” 
for 17 ms, followed by a 1000 ms mask) influenced affective regulation (Koole and Coenen, 
2007). 
 
It's currently unknown how implicit manipulations of self-focus would affect cardiovascular 
reactivity during active coping. Given that implicit and explicit self-focus manipulations 
replicate each other and evoke the same self-evaluative and self-regulatory mechanisms, one 
would expect implicit self-focus to have the same influence on effort-related cardiovascular 
reactivity. Testing the effects of name priming on effort is valuable for several reasons. First, it 
extends the large literature on self-focused attention and motivation into new directions, given 
that most of that literature was developed prior to psychology's interest in implicit processes. 
Second, studying name priming extends an emerging interest in implicit processes in effort 
regulation, such as how masked primes influence the perceived difficulty of goal attainment or 
an orientation to act (Gendolla and Silvestrini, 2010 and Gendolla and Silvestrini, 2011). 
 
Finally, it's unclear how manipulated self-focus and trait self-focus jointly influence effort-
related cardiovascular reactivity. Past work has shown effects for state self-focus (Gendolla et 
al., 2008 and Silvia et al., 2010) and for trait self-focus (Silvia et al., 2011). Self-focus research, 
however, often finds interactions between manipulated and measured self-focus (e.g., Buss and 
Scheier, 1976, Carver and Scheier, 1978 and Kleinke et al., 1998). In a recent review, Fenigstein 
(2009) remarked that the nature of these interactions remains obscure — some studies find that 
state manipulations diminish the effects of individual differences (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 
1978), whereas other studies find that state self-focus amplifies the effects of individual 
differences (e.g., Brockner, 1979) — so it is important for research to untangle how states and 
traits interact. 
 
2. The present research 
In the present experiment, we examined the effects of implicit self-focus, manipulated via 
masked first name priming, on cardiovascular reactivity during active coping. People completed 
a self-paced cognitive task, and we manipulated four levels of prime frequency during the task: 
0% (a no-priming control condition), 33% of the trials, 67% of the trials, and 100% of the trials. 
We explored several levels of priming frequency because higher prime frequencies can 
sometimes lead to habituation to the prime (e.g., Silvestrini and Gendolla, in press). In addition, 
we measured individual differences in trait self-focus and examined its effects on cardiovascular 
reactivity, particularly if it interacted with name priming. 
 
To assess effort, we measured reactivity (change from baseline to task) for systolic blood 
pressure (SBP), diastolic blood pressure (DBP), and heart rate (HR). Of these parameters, SBP 
reactivity is the parameter most closely linked to effort (Wright, 1996). A large literature 
indicates that it is a reliable and consistent indicator of effort during active coping (e.g., Bongard, 
1995, Gerin et al., 1995, Light, 1981, Richter et al., 2008, Richter and Gendolla, 2009, Sherwood 
et al., 1990 and Smith et al., 2000). DBP reactivity often tracks SBP reactivity, and several 
studies of motivational intensity have found effects for DBP (e.g., Al'Absi et al., 1997, Gendolla 
and Richter, 2005, Silvia et al., 2010 and Silvia and al., 2011), but it is much less consistent. HR 
is the least consistent of the three, although some experiments have found effects for HR 
reactivity (e.g., Eubanks et al., 2002). 
 
Based on past work on motivational intensity and self-focus, we predicted that masked name 
priming would increase cardiovascular reactivity, particularly SBP reactivity, during the self-
paced cognitive task. Because self-focus makes achieving goals and standards more significant, 
masked name priming should increase the amount of effort people are willing to expend. Effort 
during self-paced tasks is a function of the goal's importance (Wright et al., 2002), so name 
priming should increase effort for such tasks. We expected trait self-focus to increase effort, 
given past work (Silvia et al., 2011), but we didn't have specific predictions concerning how trait 
self-focus would interact with name priming. 
 
3. Method 
3.1. Participants and design 
A total of 56 people (40 women and 16 men) enrolled in General Psychology at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro participated as part of a research participation option. Four cases 
were excluded (three due to equipment issues, one because the participant thought she may have 
seen her first name), leaving a final sample of 52 people (37 women and 15 men). Based on self-
reported race and ethnicity, the sample was approximately 48% European American, 31% 
African American, 11% Asian American, and 6% Hispanic or Latino. Age ranged from 18 to 30 
(M = 18.7, SD = 1.90). The project was approved by our university's Institutional Review Board 
(IRB), and all participants signed an informed consent form approved by the IRB. 
 
Name priming was manipulated with four levels — no name priming, 33% priming, 67% 
priming, and 100% priming — and each person was randomly assigned to one of these between-
subject conditions. 
 
3.2. Cardiovascular assessment 
We measured SBP (mm Hg), DBP (mm Hg), and HR (bpm) with an automated Dinamap 
cardiovascular monitor (1846sx or 8100; Critikon, USA) using the oscillometric method. The 
experimenter placed a cuff over the brachial artery of the participant's non-dominant arm. There 
were four baseline assessments (one every two minutes) and five task assessments (one every 
minute). 
 
3.3. Procedure 
Everyone participated individually. After participants provided informed consent, the 
experimenter explained that the study was about how the body responded during cognitive tasks. 
The experiment started with a baseline period, during which participants sat quietly and 
completed a questionnaire. Four cardiovascular assessments were taken every two minutes 
during the baseline period. 
 
3.3.1. Assessment of trait self-focus 
The baseline questionnaire contained measures of individual differences in trait self-focus among 
many filler scales. As in our past work (Silvia et al., 2011), we used two scales: the 9-item 
private self-consciousness scale from the revised self-consciousness scales (Scheier and Carver, 
1985) and the 12-item self-reflection scale (Grant et al., 2002). These scales assess the same 
construct and correlate highly (Silvia and Phillips, 2011). 
 
3.3.2. The d2 task 
The experimenter then introduced the “cognitive task,” which was a computerized version of the 
d2 test of attention (Brickenkamp and Zillmer, 1998). This task has been used in several recent 
studies of motivational intensity (Gendolla and Richter, 2005, Gendolla et al., 2008, Silvia et al., 
2010 and Silvia and al., 2011). For the d2 task, a d or a p is shown on the computer screen. The d 
or p has up to 2 apostrophes above and below it, and people must indicate whether it is a d2 (a d 
with 2 apostrophes above it, 2 apostrophes below it, or with one above and one below it). 
Participants pressed a green button if the letter was a d with exactly 2 apostrophes and a blue 
button for all other items (all ps and ds with 1, 3, or 4 apostrophes). People provided responses 
with their dominant hand on a Cedrus RB-834 response pad (Cedrus, USA); the task was 
presented and controlled using SuperLab Pro 2.0.4 (Cedrus, USA). 
 
3.3.3. Priming manipulation 
Name priming was accomplished by briefly presenting the participant's first name before each 
trial. In the 33%, 67%, and 100% name priming conditions, the trial began with a fixation cross 
(250 ms) followed by the person's first name (27 ms), a random letter mask (100 ms), and the d2 
item. The items remained onscreen until participants gave a response. After a 100 ms pause, the 
next trial began. In the name priming conditions, either one-third (33% priming), two-thirds 
(67% priming), or all (100% priming) of the trials presented the person's first name. Unprimed 
trials showed a string of random consonants for 27 ms instead of the name. In the no-priming 
control condition, all of the trials presented the random letter string for 27 ms. All letters were 
presented in 48 pt uppercase Tahoma in black against a white background. The prime and mask 
were explained by noting that the study was also interested in how mild distractions can 
influence performance. 
 
The experimenter explained that the goal was to get as many d2 trials right during the 5 min task 
period. Because giving a response terminated the trial and started the next one — the task was 
unfixed in difficulty (Wright et al., 2002) — people could work at their own pace. To familiarize 
themselves with the task, people completed 22 practice trials. The practice trials were unscored, 
and no name priming occurred during the practice phase. 
 
The d2 task lasted for 5 min in each condition. Cardiovascular responses were measured 5 times, 
once per minute, starting with the task's onset. After the task, participants were probed about the 
priming manipulation using the funneled approach described by Bargh and Chartrand (2000). 
This approach starts with global questions and impressions of the task and then shifts to 
questions about the priming and masking procedure, such as if people found the flashes of letters 
distracting. Eventually, people are asked if they think they saw anything before the random letter 
mask, if they thought they saw any real words, and if they thought they saw their name. Only one 
participant indicated that she thought she might have seen her name, and no one indicated that 
they thought they saw real words. The low incidence is consistent with our past work that used 
implicit name priming during self-paced cognitive tasks (Silvia and Phillips, under review). 
Afterward, participants were debriefed, thanked, and given the opportunity to ask questions 
about the research. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Data reduction and analysis strategy 
We averaged the final three baseline assessments to form baseline scores for SBP (α = .86), 
DBP (α = .90), and HR (α = .98). (The first baseline assessment was discarded because it was 
significantly higher than the others.) Table 1 displays the baseline values. There were no 
significant between-group differences in SBP, DBP, or HR for the baseline scores, according to 
one-way ANOVAs with S–N–K follow-up tests. The five task assessments were averaged to 
form overall task scores for SBP (α = .96), DBP (α = .96), and HR (α = .97). Cardiovascular 
reactivity was scored by computing difference (delta) scores. To test for possible carry-over or 
initial-value effects, we tested whether the baseline scores covaried with the difference scores. 
The correlation for SBP was not significant, but the correlations for DBP (r(52) = −.33, p = .017) 
and HR (r(52) = −.37, p = .007) were, so those analyses were conducted using difference scores 
that were residualized with respect to the baseline values (Llabre et al., 1991). As in our past 
work (Silvia et al., 2011), scores for private self-consciousness (α = .69) and self-reflection (
α = .89) correlated highly (r(52) = .73), so the overall scale scores were standardized and 
averaged to form a trait self-focus composite score (M = 0,SD = .93). 
Table 1. Cardiovascular baseline values. 
 No priming 33% name 67% name 100% name 
SBP 
 M 113 115 114 113 
 SE 3.21 3.46 2.42 2.60 
 DBP     
 M 67 66 64 65 
 No priming 33% name 67% name 100% name 
 SE 2.24 2.37 1.84 2.20 
 HR 
 M 80 88 85 79 
 SE 2.32 2.57 4.03 3.86 
Note. SBP = systolic blood pressure; DBP = diastolic blood pressure; and HR = heart rate. SBP 
and DBP are in mm Hg; HR is in beats per minute. n = 13 per condition. Mean values are 
rounded to the nearest whole number. 
We used regression models to estimate the effects of name priming, trait self-focus, and their 
interaction. Because we were not committed a priori to predictions regarding prime frequency, 
we estimated two models for each outcome. The first model estimated polynomial effects (linear 
and quadratic) of name priming, a main effect of trait self-focus, and the interactions between 
trait self-focus and the linear and quadratic contrasts. The second model estimated a focused 
comparison that contrasted the no-priming control condition (weight = − 3) with the three name 
priming conditions (weights = 1). This contrast compares the control condition with the average 
of all three name priming conditions. The second model also estimated the main effect of trait 
self-focus and the interaction between trait self-focus and the 3 vs. 1 contrast. The regression 
models were estimated in Mplus 6 using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. All 
regression weights are unstandardized. 
4.2. Cardiovascular reactivity 
4.2.1. SBP reactivity 
For SBP reactivity, the polynomial regression model found only a marginal quadratic effect of 
name priming (b = − 1.51, SE = .86, p = .079), a main effect of trait self-focus 
(b = 1.78, SE = .81, p = .028), and a significant interaction between the linear contrast and trait 
self-focus (b = − 1.12, SE = .26, p < .001). The lack of significant polynomial main effects for 
name priming is consistent with the pattern of means (see Table 2), which suggests a 3 vs. 1 
pattern instead of a linear or quadratic trend. 
Table 2. Cardiovascular reactivity and first name priming: descriptive statistics. 
 No priming 33% name 67% name 100% name 
SBP 
 No priming 33% name 67% name 100% name 
 M 1.26 5.27 4.09 3.69 
 SE 2.02 1.91 1.36 2.31 
 DBP 
 M −.19 − 2.11 .31 1.99 
 SE 1.32 1.66 1.91 1.60 
 HR 
 M −.12 −1.17 1.92 −.62 
 SE 1.33 1.12 1.63 1.14 
Note. SBP = systolic blood pressure; DBP = diastolic blood pressure; and HR = heart rate. SBP 
and DBP are in mm Hg; HR is in beats per minute. n = 13 per condition. Values for DBP and HR 
are baseline-corrected. 
The 3 vs. 1 contrast model, in fact, found a significant main effect for the 3 vs. 1 contrast 
(b = 1.25, SE = .40,p = .002), a significant main effect of trait self-focus 
(b = 1.72, SE = .71, p = .016), and a significant interaction between the contrast and trait self-
focus (b = − 1.39, SE = .37, p < .001). Fig. 1 illustrates the interaction using the predicted values 
from the above regression weights (intercept = 3.14). Trait self-focus was evaluated at values of 
− 1.5 (low) and 1.5 (high), which are approximately 1.5 standard deviations away from its mean 
of zero and are well within its range of observed values. In the control condition, people high in 
trait self-focus had significantly higher SBP reactivity than people low in trait self-focus 
(r(13) = .77,p = .002). This finding extends past work on trait self-focus and SBP reactivity for 
fixed-difficulty tasks (Silvia et al., 2011) and on state self-focus for self-paced tasks (Gendolla et 
al., 2008). In the name priming conditions, however, trait self-focus didn't affect SBP reactivity 
(r(39) = .04, p = .79). The name priming manipulation thus washed out the effects of individual 
differences. 
 
Fig. 1. Predicted values for the interaction of trait self-focus and name priming on SBP 
reactivity. 
4.2.2. DBP reactivity 
For DBP reactivity, the polynomial regression model revealed only a marginal effect of the 
linear trend (b = .52, SE = .31, p = .097) and a significant interaction between the linear trend 
and trait self-focus (b = −.46, SE = .21, p = .026). The 3 vs. 1 contrast model revealed no 
significant main effects, but there was a marginal interaction between the 3 vs. 1 contrast and 
trait self-focus (b = −.64, SE = .33, p = .054). The pattern resembled the interaction for SBP 
reactivity: Trait self-focus more strongly predicted DBP reactivity in the control condition 
(r(13) = .38, p = .19) than in the name priming conditions (r(39) = −.09, p = .58). Table 2 depicts 
DBP reactivity across the four name priming conditions. 
4.2.3. HR reactivity 
For HR reactivity, the polynomial regression model revealed only a marginal interaction between 
the linear trend and trait self-focus (b = −.46, SE = .27, p = .085). The 3 vs. 1 contrast model 
yielded no significant main effects or interactions. Table 2 depicts HR reactivity across the four 
name priming conditions. 
4.3. Task performance 
We explored effects on performance during the 5 min d2 task, particularly the number of errors, 
the number of correct trials, and average response time (RT) for the correct trials. As before, we 
estimated both polynomial and 3 vs. 1 regression models. Table 3 depicts the descriptive 
statistics. For errors, the polynomial regression model found a significant quadratic trend 
(b = 3.65, SE = 1.61, p = .023), reflecting more errors in the control and 100% priming 
conditions, and a significant interaction between trait self-focus and the quadratic trend 
(b = 3.30, SE = 1.57, p = .035), reflecting a weaker quadratic effect among people low in trait 
self-focus. No effects appeared for the 3 vs. 1 contrast model. 
Table 3. Name priming effects on task performance: descriptive statistics. 
 No priming 33% name 67% name 100% name 
Response time 645 (24.79) 706 (25.12) 657 (34.14) 634 (15.58) 
Correct trials 248 (7.15) 247 (5.60) 260 (7.09) 256 (4.84) 
Errors 16.5 (4.71) 5.9 (1.26) 7.2 (2.62) 12.4 (3.73) 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Mean response times and correct trials are rounded to 
the nearest whole number. n = 13 per condition. 
For number of correct trials, only a main effect for trait self-focus was found for both the 
polynomial model (b = − 6.55, SE = 3.26, p = .045) and the 3 vs. 1 contrast model 
(b = − 6.01, SE = 3.03, p = .047): People high in trait self-focus completed fewer correct trials 
overall. For RT, there was a marginal main effect for the quadratic trend 
(b = − 22.24, SE = 11.47, p = .052), reflecting faster responses in the control and 100% priming 
conditions, as well as a main effect for trait self-focus (b = 26.04, SE = 12.89, p = .043), 
reflecting longer RTs as trait self-focus increased; the 3 vs. 1 regression model found only a 
marginal main effect of trait self-focus (b = 23.97, SE = 12.72, p = .060). 
Finally, we examined the correlations between cardiovascular reactivity scores and the measures 
of performance. SBP and DBP reactivity did not correlate significantly with RT, number of 
correct trials, or errors. As HR reactivity increased, however, people completed more correct 
trials (r(52) = .298, p = .032) and had faster response times (r(52) = −.319, p = .021). 
5. General discussion 
The present research bridges three traditions in self-awareness research. One line of work shows 
that explicit manipulations of self-focus influence effort-related cardiovascular responses in the 
manner predicted by motivational intensity theory (Gendolla et al., 2008 and Silvia et al., 2010). 
A second line of work shows that implicit manipulations of self-focus influence self-regulation, 
albeit for measures of judgment and behavior and not for physiological outcomes (Koole and 
Coenen, 2007, Macrae et al., 1998 and Silvia and Phillips, under review). Finally, a third line of 
work shows that state and trait self-focus can interactively influence motivation and self-
regulation, although the form of the interaction remains unclear (Fenigstein, 2009). 
 
In our experiment, we found that masked first name priming influenced SBP reactivity during 
the self-paced task. Interestingly, the relative priming frequency (33%, 67%, or 100%) seemed 
unimportant; regression models found significant support for a 3 vs. 1 pattern (all priming 
conditions vs. the control) but not for polynomial effects of priming. Thus, this study provides 
the first evidence that implicit manipulations of self-focus influence SBP reactivity in the manner 
expected by motivational intensity theory. The similar effects across priming frequency is 
consistent with past work on masked name priming, which has varied frequency across studies. 
Some studies presented names for 100% of the trials (Silvia and Phillips, under review), but 
others have primed only some of the trials (e.g., 50%; Koole and Coenen, 2007;Macrae et al., 
1998). 
 
Furthermore, we found that state and trait self-focus significantly interacted. When state self-
focus was low (the 0% priming condition), trait self-focus significantly predicted SBP reactivity. 
This effect extends recent work on trait self-focus (Silvia et al., 2011), which found that trait 
self-focus predicted patterns of SBP reactivity for fixed-difficulty tasks, as well as experimental 
studies of unfixed-difficulty tasks that manipulated self-focus (Gendolla et al., 2008). When state 
self-focus was high (33%, 67%, 100% name priming), however, trait self-focus was unrelated to 
SBP reactivity — the manipulation elevated SBP reactivity regardless of individual differences. 
The form of the interaction is thus similar to past work that found that state self-focus tends to 
attenuate rather than intensify the effects of trait self-focus (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1978). 
 
As expected based on past research on effort-related cardiovascular reactivity, the strongest 
effects appeared for SBP reactivity. DBP reactivity showed the same broad pattern, but the 
effects were weaker, and HR reactivity showed only one marginal effect. A large body of work 
has found that SBP is the most reliable marker of effort of the three (Gendolla et al., in press), 
but our assessment method is unable to illuminate the physiological mechanisms underneath its 
effects. Recent work on motivational intensity theory has applied more sophisticated techniques 
to understanding the role of the cardiovascular system in effort, such as parameters derived from 
impedance cardiography (e.g., Capa and Audiffren, 2009 and Richter and Gendolla, 2009), and 
these would be a fruitful direction for future research on self-focus and effort. 
 
5.1. Effort and performance 
Effort-related cardiovascular reactivity and task performance were only loosely coupled in the 
present data. Intuition suggests that effort should translate into performance, but the relationships 
between effort and task outcomes are complex (Hockey, 1997). Task performance is affected by 
many factors beyond effort (e.g., abilities, knowledge, and strategies relevant to a task), so 
research commonly finds dissociations between effort-related physiological processes and task 
performance (e.g., Richter and Gendolla, 2009 and Silvia et al., 2010). For the sample as a 
whole, HR reactivity predicted more efficient performance (faster RTs and completing more 
correct trials), but SBP and DBP reactivity did not. 
 
Interestingly, people high in trait self-focus showed higher SBP reactivity but worse performance 
(slower RTs and fewer correct trials), which is consistent with the use of a “double-check” or 
“caution” strategy (Knowles and Delaney, 2005). A common error on the d2 task involves the d 
with one apostrophe above and one apostrophe below it. One way to try to get more items correct 
(the task's goal) is to avoid making mistakes, but this reduces speed and hence total trials 
completed. This illustrates a scenario in which greater effort is associated with less efficient 
performance because people adopted a less fruitful task strategy. 
 
Future work should parametrically investigate factors that influence the coupling of effort-related 
physiological responses and task performance. It seems likely that tasks involving executive 
abilities (such as the d2 task) are less strongly affected by effort than tasks that involve simple 
retrieval and matching processes (e.g., Gendolla and Silvestrini, 2010). As fluid cognitive 
abilities (e.g., executive attention, working memory, and fluid intelligence) account for more 
variance in task performance, there is less variance available to be explained by effort. 
Moreover, in such cases, people lower in fluid cognitive abilities will find the task harder and 
thus may mobilize more effort (provided the goal is worthwhile and success seems feasible), an 
example of compensatory effort (Hockey, 1997). 
 
5.2. Implications for priming and motivational intensity 
In addition to replicating and extending recent work on self-focused attention, the present 
findings add to an emerging interest in how priming can influence effort-related cardiovascular 
responses. Traditionally, research testing motivational intensity theory has concerned conscious, 
explicit processes, such as appraisals of the task's difficulty and one's abilities (Kemper et al., 
2008 and Wright and Dill, 1993); conscious experiences, such as fatigue and moods (Nolte et al., 
2008 and Silvestrini and Gendolla, 2009); and obvious incentives, such as gaining money or 
avoiding aversive events (Richter and Gendolla, 2009 and Wright et al., 1992). Recent work, 
however, has considered how primed information presented outside of awareness can influence 
effort-related physiological responses. For example, Gendolla and Silvestrini (2011) found that 
rapid masked presentations of sad, happy, and angry faces affected cardiovascular reactivity by 
influencing people's appraisals of the task's difficulty. Additionally, masked action primes — 
words such as run, go, and fast — can directly influence cardiovascular reactivity during active 
coping (Gendolla and Silvestrini, 2010), and pairing a subliminally presented goal with 
consciously presented positive words increases several cardiovascular markers of effort (Capa et 
al., in press). 
 
In the present work, we found evidence that masked priming can influence potential motivation, 
the importance of achieving the goal. Because effort-related reactivity in self-paced tasks is a 
function of goal importance (Wright et al., 2002), the fact that first name priming increased SBP 
reactivity for the d2 task suggests that name priming has an implicit influence on potential 
motivation. A goal for future research is to identify how different kinds of primes interact, such 
as if action primes and first name primes have interactive or independent effects, given that 
relatively little is known about implicit influences on effort regulation. 
 
Future work could also expand on the inner mechanics of name priming. We have proposed that 
masked name priming operates much like explicit manipulations of self-focus. Like those 
manipulations, name priming activates self-knowledge and initiates an automatic self-evaluative 
process (Duval and Silvia, 2001). This claim seems reasonable given the small literature on name 
priming, particularly the fact that explicit manipulations (e.g., showing people their reflection in 
a mirror) and name priming show similar effects across and within experiments (Macrae et al., 
1998 and Silvia and Phillips, under review). But there are other possibilities that ought to be 
evaluated in future work. For example, name priming might foster activity that is consistent with 
habitual goals, motives, and traits, such as achievement motivation (Capa et al., 2008) or 
preferences for action over inaction (Albarracín et al., 2008), both of which are probably above 
average in a sample of American college students. These possibilities are consistent with a self-
focus interpretation — many studies show that self-focus makes people more likely to behave 
consistently with their attitudes, goals, standards, and dispositions (Carver and Scheier, 1998 and 
Silvia and Gendolla, 2001) — but future work should nevertheless examine the pathways from 
name priming to effort-related cardiovascular activity in more detail. 
 
One issue raised by the present research — and by work to date on priming and effort — 
concerns implicit and explicit awareness of primes. Priming procedures vary considerably from 
study to study, including the presentation speed of the prime, the masking parameters, and the 
nature of non-primed trials (e.g., anagrams of prime words, random letter strings, and neutral 
words). Given the timing and masking parameters in the present work, the name primes probably 
were not subliminal in the strictest sense. Because first names are highly familiar, it's possible 
that people could have discriminated primed from unprimed trials at above-chance levels despite 
a lack of conscious visual awareness of the prime. The influence of the primes is thus implicit, 
but we wouldn't claim based on these methods that the processes involved in the priming-effort 
link operate wholly outside of awareness. An experiment that parametrically manipulated 
priming parameters and assessed discrimination would reveal the degree to which awareness is 
implicated in priming effects on effort. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The present experiment extended recent research on how self-focused attention influences the 
intensity of effort-related cardiovascular activity. Based on motivational intensity theory (Brehm 
and Self, 1989), we expected that masked first name priming would make success more 
important, thereby increasing the amount of effort that people would be willing to expend. 
Consistent with the theory, masked first name priming during a self-paced cognitive task 
significantly increased SBP reactivity. Prime frequency (33%, 67%, or 100% of the trials) made 
little difference. Furthermore, individual differences in trait self-focus interacted with the name 
priming manipulation. Trait self-focus predicted higher SBP reactivity in the control condition, 
but name priming wiped out the effects of trait self-focus. Taken together, the present findings 
extend work on self-focus and motivational intensity, which has used only manipulations of 
conscious self-focus, as well as the emerging literature on how priming affects effort-related 
physiology. 
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